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Comment on Jana Singer's Alimony and Efficiency
MARGARET F. BRINIG*
I propose to make three comments on Professor Singer's article.1 First, I
will present my views on the limitations of law and economics when
applied to family law. Second, I will discuss why specialization between
husbands and wives is not necessarily efficient, and perhaps not even the
best use of law and economics in the study of the family. Finally, and
perhaps most controversially, I will question whether there are gender
differences that should impact alimony law.
I. THE LIMITS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
I will begin almost where Professor Singer left off,2 with the use of
"market failure" as a problem with the law and economics justification for
alimony. The engaged couple usually knows each other quite well, perhaps
very well if they have lived together, so there is good "quality" informa-
tion.3 They also are fairly knowledgeable about the frequency and effects
of divorce. 4 In general, however, they have no expectation that their own
marriage will end unhappily.5
* Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. I would like to thank
participants in the Symposium and the Georgetown Law Center faculty workshop for their
helpful suggestions and comments.
1. Jana B. Singer, Alimony and Efficiency: The Gendered Costs and Benefits of the Economic
Justification forAlimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2423 (1994).
2. Id. at 2451-53. (discussing marriage as a case of market failure).
3. George Stigler gives a general description of the search process. See generally George J.
Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961) (suggesting that people
continue to search for better deals until the costs of additional search outweigh the expected
gains from the search). See also Philip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J.
POL. ECON. 311, 323 (1970) (extending Stigler's theory to account for consumer ignorance
about quality variations and about how store location. affects consumer preferences). Sti-
gler's theory is extended to the marriage market in PAULA ENGLAND & GEORGE FARKAS,
HOUSEHOLDS, EMPLOYMENT AND GENDER 31-42 (1986); Gary S. Becker et al., A Theory of
Marital Instability, 85 J. POL. ECON. 1141, 1144 (1977); Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Marriage,
in ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY 299, 308-12 (Theodore W. Schultz ed., 1974); and Margaret F.
Brinig & Michael V. Alexeev, Fraud in Courtship: Annulment and Marriage, 1 EUR. J.L. &
ECON. (forthcoming 1994). The economic model predicts that participants in the marriage
market rate potential mates in terms of characteristics that will be important during the
marriage: intelligence, health, earning potential, and so forth. Eventually, when the benefits
of continued search are outweighed by its costs, the parties contract to be married.
4. Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship is Above Average, 17 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 439, 444 (1993). Although couples knew the base results of divorce and its
consequences, they displayed a "considerable lack of knowledge of divorce statutes." Law
students, however, did much better than marriage license applicants.
5. Id. at 443.
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Given the high national divorce rate, does such optimism represent a
market failure or merely the result of bad predictions? 6 Most cases in
which market "failure" makes regulation essential do not involve transac-
tions between two empowered individuals, but rather between parties with
unequal bargaining power, such as the borrower and the bank or the
tenant and the landlord.7 However, a recent survey of marriage applicants
in Charlottesville revealed that these couples, though well-informed, were
engaged in a "willing suspension of disbelief."8 Although the applicants in
this survey realized that half of all marriages end in divorce, each thought
that this surely would not be the fate of their marriage.9 While they
realized that a large percentage of all responsible spouses fail to meet their
support obligations, they refused to believe that their spouse would be-
come a part of this large percentage.1° Their denial makes some sense,
however, for it would be unreasonable to get married anticipating divorce
or distrusting one's mate.
6. In commercial settings, outcomes that are worse than predicted will rarely justify extra
contractual relief, even when losses are extremely large. See, e.g., Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 442 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (holding that when a requirements
contract for oil is violated, only contractual remedies are available despite change in oil
price). The risks of nonperformance are supposed to be reflected in the contract price. See,
e.g., Stees v. Leonard, 20 Minn. 448, 455 (1874) (once a party has agreed to perform a
service, it must be done unless completely impossible; increased expense is no excuse); see
also Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV.
1089, 1149 (1981) (even in relational contracts, parties will be required to exert the "effort
necessary to maximize the joint net product flowing" from the contract and will have to
assume necessary risks); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis
of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 632-33
(1979) (noting that consumers often make predictive decisions based upon insufficient
information); Robert E. Scott, Error and Rationality in Individual Decision-Making: An Essay
on the Relationship Between Cognitive Illusions and the Management of Choices, 59 S. CAL. L.
REV. 329, 330 (1986) (discussing the effect of information on consumer prediction deci-
sions).
7. Market failure is usually viewed as a justification for regulation because the usual
self-regulatory features of the market are ineffective. The rules of the market prescribed by
the common law may be ineffective in such cases as well. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW § 13.1, at 343 (3d ed. 1986); see also Williams v. Walker-Thomas
Furniture, 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (finding cross-collateralization contract uncon-
scionable because of unfair terms and unequal bargaining power). See generally Duncan
Kennedy, Distributional and Paternalistic Motives in Contract and Tort Law and Unequal
Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1980); Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law
of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763 (1983).
8. SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE, BIOGRAPHICA LITERARIA (1817). Jeffrey Stake suggests
that cognitive dissonance theory may explain how an engaged person may sabotage uneasy
feelings about the impending marriage. Jeffrey E. Stake, Mandatory Planning for Divorce, 45
VAND. L. REV. 397, 427 & n.126 (1992).
9. Baker & Emery, supra note 4, at 442-43. The 50% figure came from A.J. Norton & J.E.
Moorman, Current Trends in Marriage and Divorce Among American Women, 49 J. MARRIAGE
& FAM. 3, 3 (1987).
10. Baker & Emery, supra note 4, at 443. The actual figure is 50%. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERV., CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, 12TH ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS 5 (1989).
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Although I would not term these results from the Baker and Emery
survey-for example, low expectations of divorce despite a high divorce
rate-market failure, I agree with Professor Singer that the observations
accurately point out the limitations of law and economics when applied to
the family. The couples in the Charlottesville survey were "in love."' 1 Each
person surveyed was thinking beyond self-interest and toward their prospec-
tive spouse and their future together. Each was ready to engage in a set of
promises that would affect not only themselves, but ultimately, as Profes-
sor Singer has pointed out, their children and the broader society as well.
The limitations of law and economics in the family context are evi-
denced by the differences between the marriage contract and commercial
contracts. Most contracts take only their signatories into account, not
providing for effects on third parties. 12 The parties to these commercial
agreements frequently behave selfishly by attempting to secure agreements
that maximize personal benefit without regard to the effect of the contract
on the other party. Relational feminist writers characterize such private
ordering as masculine because it "envisions society's basic task as the
preservation of a zone of individualized independence," treating "as illegiti-
mate a more typically feminist emphasis on the responsibilities that arise
from the experience of a fundamentally social self.' 3 Most marriages,
however, bear little resemblance to either commercial contracts or other
Chicago School law and economics efficiency-seeking ventures.14 At their
best, marriages entail self-sacrifice, sharing, outward-looking behavior, 5
11. See, e.g., George Bernard Shaw, Getting Married, in THE DOCTOR'S DILEMMA, GET-
TING MARRIED AND THE SHEWING UP OF BLANCO POSNET 139 (1911): "[Wlhen two people
are under the influence of the most violent, most insane, most delusive, and most transient
of passions, they are required to swear that they will remain in that excited, abnormal and
exhausting condition continuously until death do them part."
12. In fact, most discussions on divorce focus on the adults in the nuclear family, and do
not allow the children to share their assets. MARTHA FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY
43 (1991).
13. MILTON C. REGAN, FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 159-60 (1992). The
idea that contracts have a masculine cast has not, of course, been lost on feminists. See
generally Janet L. Dolgin, Status and Contract in Feminist Legal Theory of the Family: A Reply
to Bartlett, 12 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 103 (1990); Mary Joe Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A
Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1065 (1985); Mary Joe Frug,
Rescuing the Impossibility Doctrine: A Postmodern Feminist Analysis of Contract Law, 140 U.
PA. L. REV. 1029 (1992); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988).
14. One older case, Alexander v. Kuykendall, 63 S.E.2d 746, 747-48 (Va. 1948), disallowed
contractual recovery by a putative wife because she acted out of love, rather than hope of
reward. The court reasoned:
Not business or money, but wedlock is what the parties contemplate. They are, or
should be, motivated by love and affection to form a mutual and voluntary compact
to live together as husband and wife, until separated by death, for the purpose of
mutual happiness, establishing a family, the continuance of the race, the propaga-
tion of children, and the general good of society.
Id.
15. See, e.g., REGAN, supra note 13, at 94-95, 188 (claiming that marriage can be built on
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and perhaps even a more "feminine" view of the universe. 16 They are
relationships, not just relational contracts.
Regardless of what the couples' prospects and predictions are ex ante,
as a society we have tremendous incentives to promote the non-contractual
view of marriage. The incentives exist precisely for the reasons Professor
Singer suggests: what is being maximized here is not financial wealth, even
though marriage may enhance monetary well-being.17 People generally do
not get married for the reason many give for going to law school-the
desire to make a lot of money. They get married because they believe (or
know) that living with the other, sharing with the other, and creating with
the other will make them happy. And the commitment, that neither will
breach even when getting out may be "more efficient,"18 is central to
selfless actions of the partners); Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking about Marriage
and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 23 (1990) (arguing that a successful marriage creates
self-fulfillment through mutual dependence and commitment); Stake, supra note 8, at 422
(noting that marriage often occasions self-sacrifice).
16. See Marion Crain, Feminism, Labor and Power, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1819, 1886 (1992).
Crain argues:
A feminine view of human nature tends to be positive and the exercise of power by
women more affirming. Such a fundamental optimism in a group that has been
colonized and oppressed, often in very violent ways, is remarkable and perhaps
accounts for the certainty of many feminists that we are unlikely to exercise power
in the same way that our oppressors have.
Id. See generally NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING (1978); CAROL
GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHIATRIC THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT
(1982). But cf. Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for Parental Equality,
38 UCLA L. REV. 1415, 1416 n.4 (1991) (arguing that men and women are not different in
their relation to their children and so should be treated equally); Tina Grillo, The Mediation
Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1550 (1991) (noting that women
approach problems in a relational context); Beverly Horsbaugh, Redefining the Family:
Recognizing the Altruistic Caretaker and the Importance of Relational Needs, 25 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 423, 457 (1992) (advocating legal recognition of the rights of caretakers and changes in
the workplace to encourage both spouses to care for their children). An alternative to the
term "feminine view" may be a "relational ethic." See REGAN, supra note 13, at 164 (defining
the relational ethnic as the way in which women more often than men define their individual-
ity in terms of their relations with others).
17. Studies have shown that married executives are paid more than their single counter-
parts. VICTOR FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 78 (1988). They may be
freed to be the "ideal worker" because of the career choices their wives make. See Felice N.
Schwartz, Management Women and the New Facts of Life, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1989,
at 65.
18. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 89-90 (2d ed. 1977)
(espousing the idea that in the commercial context, parties to a contract are both made
better off when one breaches for a better opportunity and pays the other what was expected
under the contract); Ian R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L.
REV. 947, 957 (1982) (presenting the idea that in the commercial context, parties to a
contract can be made better off when one breaches for a better opportunity and pays the
other what was expected, if transactions costs are low enough); Ian R. Macneil, The Many
Futures of Contract, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691, 722 (1974) (claiming that contracts such as
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marriage.1 9 It is the commitment (or as I have called it recently, the
covenant)20 that promotes what Professor Regan calls "the pursuit of
intimacy., 2 ' Due to this intimacy, clean breaks after lengthy marriages,
especially when children are involved, are not really possible because there
is too much invested, too much shared.22
Having said all this, I believe, like Professor Singer, that economics does
offer insights into the family, how it has changed, and how our lawmaking
affects it. In class and in one of my recent pieces, 23 I describe an "old
marriage," in which the Becker specialization model24 made perfect sense,
and a "new marriage," in which it does not.25 One of the problems of
current alimony law, as several writers have recognized, is its failure to
accommodate people who began under the "old marriage" regime and are
divorcing under the "new," no-fault system. 26 The problem of reconciling
alimony with the "new marriage," founded on equality, love, market power
marriage are based on relational concepts and are not breachable for transactional consider-
ations). Efficient breach in the marriage context is discussed in Ira M. Ellman, The Theory of
Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1, 66 & n.166 (1987).
19. REGAN, supra note 13, at 116-17; see also Bruce C. Hafen, The Family as an Entity, 22
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 865, 892 (1989) (arguing that families should be considered as entities,
and not as contracting parties).
20. Margaret F. Brinig, Status, Contract and Covenant: A Review of Family Law and the
Pursuit of Intimacy, 89 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 1994).
21. REGAN, supra note 13, at 2.
22. REGAN, supra note 13, at 148; Scott, supra note 15, at 36.
23. Margaret F. Brinig & Steven M. Crafton, Opportunism in Marriage, 22 J. LEGAL STUD.
869 (1994).
24. Becker writes that even though the parties have functioned similarly prior to marriage,
they will begin to specialize once the marriage occurs. GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE
FAMILY 31-37 (2d ed. 1991). Specialization will occur as the couple realizes gains from the
partners' comparative advantage in one or more functions. They will engage in two kinds of
labor, which he calls market labor (earning money to purchase goods) and leisure activities
(spending money, or at any rate not earning more). The spouse engaged in household
production divides time between the production of household goods and leisure. In house-
hold production, the spouse transforms purchased goods into ultimate consumption goods.
If one spouse has a comparative advantage in household production, however small,
Becker predicts that the efficient couple will specialize. He argues that because only women
can bear children, they have the comparative advantage when it comes to household
production. This advantage will increase because growing girls will invest in human capital
that enhances their efficiency at producing household goods. Their husbands, on the other
hand, will specialize in market production. They will choose human capital investments
before marriage to maximize production in the labor force. Premarriage specialization will
also make a more attractive mate.
25. Brinig & Crafton, supra note 23, at 875-81.
26. See, e.g., Brinig & Crafton, supra note 23, at 878-80 (many women have remained out
of the market to care for children and, therefore, cannot earn as much as their husbands
after divorce); ElIman, supra note 18, at 56-58, 74-77 (1989) (homemakers make a rational
decision to stay out of the job market and should have their losses mitigated); Herma Hill
Kay, An Appraisal of California's No-Fault Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 291, 315-16 (1987) (describ-
ing inadequacy of alimony provisions under California's no-fault divorce laws).
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for both spouses, and the "spaces" of Khalil Gibran, 27 has bothered me for
many years.28
The answer June Carbone and I reached to this problem is that mar-
riage in a no-fault system may involve multiple agreements. 29 There is the
central bargain, the contract terminable at-will,3" for which alimony is not
appropriate unless legislators decide that private welfare is a better system
than public assistance.31 There may also be "side deals.",32 For example,
some couples may agree that one spouse will get a graduate degree that
both will benefit from later, and that they will finance it through the
27. Discussing marriage, Gibran wrote: "Let there be spaces in your togetherness."
KHALIL GIBRAN, THE PROPHET 19 (1923).
28. In fact, my two alimony pieces coauthored with June Carbone began with the question
of how to justify damages in a contract terminable at will. Margaret F. Brinig & June R.
Carbone, The Reliance Interest in Marriage and Divorce, 62 TUL. L. REV. 855, 905 (1988); June
Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic Change and
Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L. REV. 953, 1002 (1991).
29. Brinig & Carbone, supra note 28, at 881-82; June R. Carbone, Economics, Feminism,
and the Reinvention of Alimony, or Why the Desire to Remove Distorting Incentives Does Not a
Theory Make, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1463, 1469 (1990).
30. See, e.g., Brinig & Carbone, supra note 28, at 887 & n.132 (alimony should not be
awarded based upon fault); Brinig & Crafton, supra note 23, at 880 (although modern
marriage is terminable at will, there should be damages for breach of the other terms of the
contract); Carbone & Brinig, supra note 28, at 978-79 (marriage is a contract terminable at
will); Theodore F. Haas, The Rationality and Enforceability of Contractual Restrictions on
Divorce, 66 N.C. L. REV. 879, 884 (1988) (modern liberal divorce laws are based on the
premise that parties should not be trapped in marriage); Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse
and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1809 (1985)
(no-fault divorce laws reflect a societal decision not to publicly enforce the moral standard of
life-long fidelity); Scott, supra note 15, at 17 (criticizing view of marriage as an arrangement
promoting the selfish ends of each spouse); Stake, supra note 8, at 401 (divorce has become a
matter of convenience).
31. Many women who were in middle class or working class marriages end up on welfare if
they are not supported by their former spouses. In some senses, alimony has been treated in
the literature as a less distinguished form of unemployment compensation. For descriptions
of the "private welfare" system, see Brinig & Carbone, supra note 28, at 891-92 (arguing that
Oregon has substituted private alimony for public welfare); Mary E. O'Connell, Alimony
after No-Fault: A Practice in Search of a Theory, 23 NEw ENG. L. REV. 437, 492 (1988) (noting
that alimony is awarded for practical considerations and not as "make whole" damages). See
generally LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985). A further
justification is prevention of abuse or opportunism by a party to the marriage contract. This
remedy for breach is available in a contract terminable at-will. See Brinig & Crafton, supra
note 23, at 871 & n.10 (arguing for usual damage remedies for breaches other than
dissolution of contract).
32. See, e.g., Brinig & Carbone, supra note 28, at 898 (the decision to marry "well" rather
than pursue a career can be such a "side-deal"); Carbone, supra note 29, at 1489-90 (married
couples must reach decisions as to the form of specialization each party will take); Ellman,
supra note 18, at 40-48 (noting that the wife in a traditional marriage makes many initial
investments of value only to her husband; these investments would only be made by a
self-interested bargainer in exchange for a long-term commitment); Elisabeth Landes, The
Economics of Alimony, 7 J. LEG. STUD. 35, 35 (1978) (alimony compensates wife for her
investments in the marriage, as well as her opportunity costs incurred by entering the
marriage).
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interest-free loan the other's continuing work provides.33 Alternatively,
some couples may choose to have one spouse be the primary child care-
giver, holding the more flexible job or perhaps staying at home for a few
years.34 One spouse may give up a secure job as a tenured law professor so
that the couple can move in order to accommodate the other's more
satisfying employment prospect.
These arrangements, and others like them, are part of most marriages.
They are typically the stuff of which alimony is made, because most states
do not consider that future earnings streams are marital property capable
of valuation at the time of divorce.36 Unlike Allen Parkman,37 but like
Professor Singer, I believe that alimony should encompass some invest-
ments as well as reliance losses.38 At the very least, the divorcing spouse
33. See, e.g., Katherine K. Baker, Contracting for Security: Paying Married Women What
They've Earned, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1193, 1196 (1988) (arguing that a professional degree is a
form of marital property); Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce and Quasi Rents, Or "I Gave Him
the Best Years of My Life'; 16 J. LEG. STUD. 267 (1987); Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Breaking Up is
Hard to Do: The Economics of Spousal Support (May 19, 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the Georgetown Law Journal).
34. See, e.g., Carbone & Brinig, supra note 28, at 986 (noting that new model of alimony
sees childrearing as compensable because of lost career opportunities); ElIman, supra note
18, at 53-73; O'Connell, supra note 31, at 498-506; Marcia O'Kelly, Entitlement to Spousal
Support After Divorce, 66 N.D. L. REV. 225 (1985) (arguing that marital specialization often
causes women to remain home to rear children). See generally Beninger & Smith, Career
Opportunity Cost A Factor in Spousal Support Determination, 16 FAM. L.Q. 201, 203 (1982)
(noting that wives still have primary responsibility for childcare).
35. See, e.g., ElIman, supra note 18, at 61-62.
36. The only state to do so consistently is New York. See O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d
712, 718 (N.Y. 1988) ("[F]ixing the present value of that enhanced earning capacity ... [is]
no more difficult than computing tort damages for wrongful death or diminished earning
capacity from injury."). Cases rejecting the idea include: Graham v. Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 77
(Colo. 1978) (holding that an educational degree was not marital property within the
meaning of the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act); In re Marriage of Weinstein, 470
N.E.2d 551, 560 (II1. App. Ct. 1984) ("We decline to adhere to [the] view that ... potential
increased future earning capacity should be labelled instead as the value of [a] degree and
license and in that guise be considered marital property."); Stern v. Stern, 331 A.2d 257, 260
(N.J. 1975) ("We agree with defendant's contention that a person's earning capacity, even
where its development has been aided or enhanced by the other spouse, as is here the case,
should not be recognized as a separate, particular item of property."). See generally Brinig &
Crafton, supra note 23, at 889 & n.56.
37. ALLEN M. PARKMAN, No FAULT DIVORCE, WHAT WENT WRONG? 41, 130 (1992).
38. One way this could be accomplished is through an equitable lien imposed on the-other
spouse's property, a concept borrowed from community property jurisdictions. See Margaret
F. Brinig, The Law and Economics of No-Fault Divorce-A Review of No-Fault Divorce: What
Went Wrong, 26 FAM. L.Q. 453, 459-60 & n.45 (1993) (arguing that the investment of human
capital justifies payments from one spouse to another); see also Deborah A. Batts, Remedy
Refocus: In Search of Equity in "Enhanced Spouse/Other Spouse" Divorces, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV.
751, 780-81 (1988) (noting that alimony awards can act as a lien on a spouse's property);
Joan M. Krauskopf, Recompense for Financing Spouse's Education: Legal Protection for the
Marital Investment in Human Capital, 28 KAN. L. REV. 379, 402 (1980) (arguing that a
spouse's assistance in education is an investment in human capital that should be split at
divorce); Christopher J. Bruce, A Contractual Model of the Determination of Spousal
Support Upon Divorce (May 1994) (unpublished working paper, on file with the Georgetown
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who put the other through school should receive the original investment
plus interest. 39 The interest rate should reflect that this was a relatively
risky loan (or, if you prefer, dividends on the equity contribution that will
fluctuate with the "profitability" of the investment). The recovery should
not depend upon an opportunity lost by the investing spouse. One of the
particularly galling cases that I discovered involved a nurse who put her
husband through dental school in addition to raising their son.4 When he
became a pediatric dentist, earning four times her salary, and then di-
vorced her, the court did not award her any alimony because her career
had not suffered.4" In all fairness, she ought to have been able to recover
under either an investment or a quantum meruit theory.4 2
There are other functions of alimony as well, as Professor Singer notes.
These, too, relate to a more general civil obligation scheme.43 First, in Carl
Schneider's terms, alimony serves a particular channeling function.' It
urges us into what society believes is a more beneficial path for us and for
our children. Alimony in particular and family law in general make us
behave more like ideal couples in happy marriages. We need more invest-
ing in each other and in the relationship, not more specialization. We need
not be "efficient," just good partners and good parents.46
Cast in economic terms, this channeling function is related to the idea
that a credible threat of alimony will deter negative behavior (on the
margin).47 Not only may alimony cause us to invest in our relationships
Law Journal) (suggesting recovery of gains where they are greater than the couple predicted
at the time the arrangement was made).
39. PARKMAN, supra note 37, at 41.
40. Gagliano v. Gagliano, 211 S.E.2d 62 (Va. 1975).
41. Id. at 65.
42. See, e.g., Dela Rosa v. Dela Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981) (court has equitable
power to reimburse working spouse for expenditures toward student spouse's living costs and
tuition).
43. Carbone & Brinig, supra note 28, at 954 & n.3,957-61.
44. Carl E. Schneider, The Channeling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495
(1992).
45. See, e.g., REGAN, supra note 13, at 187 (discussing the role of family law as the creator
of human caring that restricts selfish actions).
46. Id. at 188.
47. Civil liability in general is described by economists as a system of incentives designed
to encourage or deter future behavior. See ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW AND ECONOMICS: A
COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THEORY AND PRACTICE 2-5 (1990) (explaining the use of
economics to explore and question current legal arrangements). See generally MITCHELL A.
POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (1989); Victor P. Goldberg, Price
Adjustments in Long Term Contracts, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 527; Victor P. Goldberg, Trade
Regulation and the Role of Government in Private Insurance Markets: Comment on Danzon, 13
J. LEGAL STUD. 565 (1989).
For a discussion of how this system of incentives applies to marital behavior, see Lynn A.
Baker, Promulgating the Marriage Contract, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 217, 232 (1990) (suggesting




(decreasing the probability of divorce),4 but it may deter the kind of
behavior that ended in Virginia's most celebrated family law case49 since
the Lovings' lawsuit.5" This, too, is a worthwhile goal not requiring gender
specialization.
A third goal, also recognized by Professor Singer, is that when we give
couples some enforceable security in their marriage while allowing for
intimate behavior, we decrease the need for protective measures. Econo-
mists call these behaviors "rent-protective devices."5 When discussing
these devices, economists usually do not use marriage as their example,
but instead write about such things as burglar alarms, dead-bolt locks, and
Doberman pinschers. These are acquisitions that are not wealth generat-
ing in themselves; rather, they are acquired to protect one's wealth. In
marriage, protective devices may not even be utility neutral, they may
actually be happiness decreasing.52 For example, a spouse may continue
employment in an unfulfilling job solely to preserve his or her options in
the event that the marriage fails. Similarly, a spouse may not cut off all
extramarital romantic contacts, just in case the marriage goes sour.5 3 A
spouse may choose to spend time with premarital hobbies or activities to
reduce the degree of loneliness if the marriage does not work out.
54
II. WHY SPECIALIZATION ISN'T ALWAYS EFFICIENT
To this point I have argued that efficiency, at least in a financial sense,
need not be the goal of the family. Next, I would like to address some
problems inherent in the economists' view of specialization, comparative
48. Brinig & Crafton, supra note 23, at nn.104-06.
49. Bobbitt v. Bobbitt, (Chancery Ct. No. 34993) (Cir. Ct. Prince William County, Md.,
July 9, 1993). The argument is not that any single act of spousal abuse might not occur, but
that "marginal" or undecided spouses may think twice if they know that abusive behavior
will result in substantial financial penalties. For example, to the extent that much abuse
occurs when the battering spouse is intoxicated, he (or she) may refrain from drinking.
50. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating Virginia's antimiscegenation statute
and declaring that marriage is a fundamental right).
51. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169, 200-01 (1968) (describing the private measures taken to protect against crime,
and hypothesizing that fines for criminal behavior would decrease this expenditure); Charles
K. Rowley, Rent-Seeking Versus Directly Unproductive Profit-Seeking Activities, in THE POLITI-
CAL ECONOMY OF RENT SEEKING 15, 22 (Charles K. Rowley et al. eds., 1988) (proposing that
rent-seeking activities may increase the utility of the individual while decreasing wealth or
social good).
52. See, e.g., Stake, supra note 8, at 406 (investing in protective measures such as a career
reduces the investment in the marriage and increases the possibility of divorce).
53. This is apparently what led to the demise of the marriage of Burger King's president
in Smith v. Smith, 400 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1981).
54. Sometimes even this seemingly benign loss limitation technique can harm the mar-
riage. For example, a recent Virginia case involved a woman who began to "build up walls"
early in her marriage, eventually screening her husband out. Sprott v. Sprott, 355 S.E.2d 881,
882-83 (Va. 1987).
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advantage, and efficiency in marriage. There are several points here, and
they relate to the assumptions Becker,55 Ellman,56 and Parkman57 make,
which, in turn, generate a particular, gendered, family law regime.58
I think five assumptions (among the twelve identified)59 are most critical
to the efficiency argument. The economists assume:
55. GARY S. BECKER, TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 15-21 (1981) [hereinafter BECKER,
TREATISE]; Gary S. Becker, A Theory of the Allocation of Time, 75 ECON. J. 493, 512 (1965)
[hereinafter Becker, Allocation]; Becker, supra note 3, at 30-53; Becker et al., supra note 3, at
1145-46; see also Reuben Gronau, The Intrafamily Allocation of Time: The Value of the
Housewives' Time, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 634, 649 (1973) (assuming that women's work inside
the home is worth more than what she could earn in the market, thereby making specializa-
tion efficient); Elisabeth M. Landes, The Economics of Alimony, 7 J. LEGAL STuD. 35, 41-42 (1978)
(assuming that both spouses will specialize in order to increase the income of the household).
56. Ellman, supra note 18, at 46-47.
57. PARKMAN, supra note 37, at 28-34.
58. The predictions of the efficient specialization model include a fault system to protect
against shirking, see BECKER, supra note 24, at 49; alimony to protect the wife's human
capital investment in marriage, Landes, supra note 55, at 46; the recognition that the
husband makes important decisions for the couple, see Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The
First Women's Rights Claims Concerning Wives' Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J.
1073 (1994); and the presumptions in favor of wife in custody, see, e.g., FuCHs, supra note 17, at 42-74.
59. The other assumptions include the postulate that the wife and husband have children
(or plan to have them), see, e.g., BECKER, supra note 24, at 44-45; that the husband can earn
enough to support the family, see, e.g., Brinig, supra note 38, at 456 & n.20; that the children
make no contribution to "household production" and that there must be something to
discourage opportunism in contract, see, e.g., BECKER, supra note 24, at 30-31; cf. Cohen,
supra note 33, at 283-84; that the children will be in the household for most of the marriage,
BECKER, supra note 24, at 55 (noting that the need for this is declining, so there is more
incentive to invest in market-oriented human capital); that the split between leisure and
work time is equal between the spouses, BECKER, supra note 24, at 56; and that they should
not deduct wasted human capital resources from the total household production, see, e.g.,
Becker, et al., supra note 3, at 1145-47. But cf Landes, supra note 55, at 41, ("It is important
to emphasize that the cost to the family in terms of the wife's earnings includes not only
current foregone earnings but also loss of market earning power, through depreciation of
market skills previously acquired, and foregone opportunities to invest in market skills.").
On the other hand, a more modern model of marriage as a partnership might involve
assumptions like individualism within the marriage, equality among spouses, roughly equiva-
lent earning capacity between the spouses, and a need for flexibility over time. The legal
regime governing this more modern model would likely include no-fault divorce, see PARK-
MAN, supra note 37, at 72; Douglas Allen, What's at Fault with No Fault?, (September 25,
1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Georgetown Law Journal); no alimony, or
rehabilitative alimony only, see H. Elizabeth Peters, Marriage and Divorce: Informational
Constraints and Private Ordering, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 437, 449 (1986); and no presumptions
favoring either spouse with respect to custody, and equal responsibility for child support, see
generally Czapanskiy, supra note 16. Behavioral predictions of this system include more
prenuptial contracts, see Cohen, supra note 33, at 297; Ellman, supra note 18, at 10 & n.18;
Stake, supra note 8, at 415-25; see also Marjorie Macguire Schultz, Contractual Ordering of
Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 CAL. L. REV. 204, 242 (1982); more variety among
marriages and families such as single parent homes, adoptive families, blended families, and
lesbian and gay families, Martha Minow, All in the Family and in All Families: Membership,
Loving, and Owing, 95 W. VA. L. REV. 275, 286 (1993); more divorces, PARKMAN, supra note
37, at 94; Brinig & Crafton, supra note 23, at 883; Ellman, supra note 18, at 45; more suits
among spouses, Brinig & Crafton, supra note 23, at 892; less investment in marriage,
PARKMAN, supra note 37, at 94; Becker et al., supra note 3, at 1142; Brinig & Crafton, supra
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One. The wife is better at child care than her husband.6" This may be for
biological reasons or because she has invested more in nonmarket human
capital prior to marriage than he has.61
Two. The wife earns less than her husband in the labor market.62 Becker
notes the circularity of some of these arguments as he writes:
If child care and other housework demand relatively large quantities of
"energy" compared to leisure and other nonmarket uses of time by men,
women with responsibility for housework would have less energy avail-
able for the market than men. This would reduce the hourly earnings of
married women, affect their jobs and occupations, and even lower their
investment in market human capital when they worked the same number
of market hours as married men. Consequently, the housework responsi-
bilities of married women may be the source of much of the difference in
earnings and in job segregation between men and women.
63
Three. There is specialization between husband and wife, but not among
women. The writers assume it is not "efficient" to hire someone else to do
the wash or clean the house.64
note 23, at 883; Cohen, supra note 33, at 287, 295; Ellman, supra note 18, at 25; more
investment in individual human capital, see Cohen, supra note 33, at 295; Marsha Garrison,
Marriage: The Status of Contract, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1039, 1058 (1983); fewer children,
BECKER, supra note 24, at 349; PARKMAN, supra note 37, at 94-96; Becker, et al., supra note 3,
at 1172; Brinig & Crafton, supra note 23, at 887; and fewer marriages, see Brinig & Crafton,
supra note 23, at 884; Cohen, supra note 33, at 296; Peters, supra at 443-44.
60. See, e.g., PARKMAN, supra note 37, at 28 (arguing that women specializing in child care
is more efficient because only women can give birth and women earn less than men).
61. See, e.g., Becker et al., supra note 3, at 1146 (describing the areas where women invest
their capital: child rearing, household management, and domestic activities); PARKMAN,
supra note 37, at 29-33 (tracing a woman's choice to specialize to both biology and poorer
chances in the work market).
62. I am using Parkman's simplification that wives earn only 60% of their husband's
income. PARKMAN, supra note 37, at 28 & n.7; see also Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M.
Kahn, The Gender Earnings Gap: Learning from International Comparisons, 82 AM. ECON.
REV. PAPERS & PROC. 533, 534 & tbl. 1 (1992) (59.44% for married women, 1985-86). More
recent data places the number somewhat higher. See Ellman, supra note 18, at 46 & n.137
(noting that in three-fourths of marriages where both spouses work, the wife's earnings were
less than 80% of her husband's). If the rest of the economic assumptions held true,
"efficiency" might still dictate complete specialization. See Yoram Barzel & Ben T. Yu, The
Effect of the Utilization Rate on the Division of Labor, 22 ECON. INQUIRY 18, 23-24 (1984)
(arguing that diminishing returns from further specialization reduce some, but not all, of its
value).
63. BECKER, supra note 24, at 56; see also Ellman, supra note 18, at 4 & n.2 (estimating
that the difference in domestic responsibilities accounts for 70% of the difference in
earnings between men and women).
64. For a more lengthy discussion of this proposition, see Brinig, supra note 38, at 456-57
& nn.20-22. I am not advocating that parents should abdicate child rearing functions to an
underpaid class of child care specialists or to government-regulated services. In an ideal
world, both parents would be actively, and nearly equally, involved in their children's lives.
For the time being, perhaps for most of our generation, I don't see enough adjustments in
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Four. The only things that should be maximized are dollar income and
the production of household commodities. Economists do not count the
wife's psychic costs when they calculate her opportunity cost of staying out
of the labor market.65 Similarly, when economists work with the husband's
labor force production, they do not count the cost of his working "to
capacity" in the labor market at the expense of having real relationships
with his children.
Five. Most important for this discussion, there are no diminishing re-
turns in this model, but always gains from additional specialization.66
Let us assume for the sake of argument that the first three conditions
are satisfied, and even that women's and men's preferences work the same
way. 67 Still, if we start counting psychic costs, and assume that neither
women nor men are as productive during their last hour of work as they
are during their first, the conclusions that follow from these assumptions
are dramatically altered.68
The Table and Figiure show that even though total production increases
with complete specialization, total profits do not increase. Thus, even if we
accept many of the very strong assumptions made by economists, specializa-
tion will not necessarily lead to efficiency because neither spouse really
benefits from "all work and no life," as my teenage daughter puts it.
Society does not benefit either, as the line for the couple's joint benefits
shows.
Even in those cases where couples choose complete specialization, realiz-
ing all Becker's efficiency gains, the decision is not economically "robust."
A recent tragic incident illustrates my point. When the wife of one of my
colleagues died in a car accident this summer, he was left quite suddenly as
the workplace to allow this kind of sharing. See Mary E. O'Connell, On the Fringe: Rethinking
the Link Between Wages and Benefits, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1421, 1478-88 (1993) (suggesting that
modern divorce imposes a double stigma of deviancy upon women, who have already
foregone a lifelong career and at divorce forgo lifelong attachment to a male). See generally
Nancy E. Dowd, Family Values and Valuing Family: A Blueprint for Family Leave, 30 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 335 (1993); Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions,
Questioning the Reforms: Feminist Perspectives on Divorce Law, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE
CROSSROADS 192 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990).
65. PARKMAN, supra note 37, at 102-03; Brinig, supra note 38, at 457; Ellman, supra note
18, at 54-55; Landes, supra note 55, at 35, 40.
66. See, e.g., PARKMAN, supra note 37, at 102 (the fear women have of the marriage
dissolving leads women to resist specialization and makes everyone worse off); Ellman, supra
note 18, at 47-48 (a wife deciding not to specialize lowers the income for the family as a
whole and increases the likelihood of divorce). A brief discussion of this problem appears in
Brinig, supra note 38, at 457-58.
67. This, too, is a strong assumption. These economists imply that individuals get the same
relative satisfaction (or frustration) out of working all the time or being home all the time.
As I will show in the next part, this is not necessarily true.
68. I know I personally went far beyond the point where diminishing marginal returns
from children set in during a recent ice storm, when I had lots to do at work, no child care,
and five children marooned at home fighting with each other.
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TABLE I
WHAT HAPPENS TO PROFIT,
69 AS OPPOSED TO PRODUCrION?
70
Total
Divi- Wife- Wife- Wife- Wife- Husband- Husband- Husband- Husband- Total Produc-
sion Labor Home Costs Profit Labor Home Costs Profit Profit tion
1 59 0 -20 39 0 59 0 59 98 137
2 56 8 -18 46 8 55 -2 61 107 155
3 51 19 -16 54 19 51 -4 66 120 178
4 47 32 -14 65 32 47 -6 73 138 209
5 39 48 -12 75 48 39 -8 79 154 237
6 29 64 -12 81 64 29 -10 83 164 255
7 19 76 -14 81 76 19 -12 83 164 257
8 11 86 -16 81 86 11 -15 82 163 259
9 5 94 -18 81 94 5 -18 81 162 261
10 0 100 -20 80 100 0 -20 80 160 260
the single parent of three children under the age of twelve. His marriage
had been ideal in the Becker sense, and the family had been very happy.
Without even the time for thought divorce brings, he had to learn nearly
everything about "household production." Had my friend's marriage been
less specialized, his grief, and that of his children, would not have been
compounded by panic and near ineptitude. Becker's model works best, if
at all, with marriages that end "in due course."
III. ARE THE ECONOMIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN
INHERENT?
My academic interest in this topic began when I was working with an
economist on a bargaining paper.71 We were examining whether Robert
Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser 72 were correct in claiming that women
trade custodial time for money at the time of divorce. We looked at
69. I realize that I am using the economic term. Profits are merely the revenues less the
costs. Perhaps happiness is better, or fulfillment. Usually economists assume that parties
continue to add units of labor until the marginal prodiuct equals the marginal cost. This
would occur in the numerical example at Division 6 or 7.
70. Gary Becker coined the term "household production." Becker, Allocation, supra note
55, at 516.
71. Margaret F. Brinig & Michael V. Alexeev, Trading at Divorce: Preferences, Legal Rules
and Transaction Costs, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 279, 280 (1993). An earlier version of
this paper also appears as Margaret F. Brinig & Michael V. Alexeev, Legal Rules, Bargaining
and Transaction Costs: The Case of Divorce, in SYSTEMATIC DISPUTE RESOLUTION 91 (Stuart
S. Nagel & Miriam K. Mills eds., 1991).
72. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 951 (1979); see also Richard Neely, The Hidden Cost of
Divorce: Barter in the Court, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 10, 1986, at 13 (noting that mothers are
forced to barter support for custody in a no-fault regime).
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FIGURE I. Specialization, Counting Costs, and Diminishing Returns
divorce outcomes from two very different legal regimes.73 We discovered
that no matter which legal regime governed, the vast majority of couples
settled prior to litigation,74 and that they divided custody and property
almost identically.75 When we tried to analyze the data in terms of market
73. As one example of a statutory regime, we chose Wisconsin, which has no-fault divorce
and alimony, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.12 (1993); rehabilitative maintenance, Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 767.26 (1993); a presumption of equal division of property, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.255
(1993); and a presumption in favor of joint custody, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.24 (1993). This
last section was amended in 1988, removing the presumption. The other example was
Virginia, which has a fault and no-fault divorce regime, VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91 (Michie
1950); the possibility of permanent alimony, VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1 (Michie 1950 &
Supp. 1994); equitable property distribution under VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 (Michie 1950
& Supp. 1994); and a "best interests standard" for child custody, VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.2
(Michie 1950 & Supp. 1994).
74. Brinig & Alexeev, supra note 71, at 280. We found that 10% of the cases in Virginia
and about 5% in Wisconsin went to trial. Id. at 294 tbl. II. This is consistent with findings of
Robert H. Mnookin, Divorce Bargaining: The Limits on Private Ordering, 18 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 1015, 1016 (1986); and Marygold S. Melli et al., The Process of Negotiation: An
Exploratory Investigation in the Context of No-Fault Divorce, 40 Wis. L. REV. 1133, 1142
(1988).
75. Brinig & Alexeev, supra note 71, at 293 & tbl. I. The wife's mean share of property in
Virginia cases was 40% (not including alimony, which was awarded in more than a third of
the cases); in Wisconsin the mean share was 50%. The wife was awarded custody in 76.6% of
the cases in Wisconsin, and 74.8% in Virginia. These differences, reflecting more than a
hundred complete files involving both custody and property distribution from a single
suburban county in each state, are not statistically significant. What was distinctive in our
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behavior, we found that there were two possible explanations for our
results. The first was that married women with children were more risk
averse than their husbands (as the literature suggested).76 The second,
which became the published result, was that men's and women's prefer-
ences for children were not the same.7 7 Our data were consistent with the
husbands "purchasing" time with their children up to "reasonable and
liberal visitation" levels. 78 If he received more time than this, he paid less
in absolute terms.79 The data did not reveal the point at which the wife's
preferences for child-time declined. This indicates that this threshold is
reached less than ten percent of the time. Once this threshold is reached,
the wife would pay to get less time with the children.8"
I still wondered, based upon anecdotal evidence, whether risk aversion
might be operating during this bargaining process. I therefore ran some
experiments of my own 81 and looked at traffic ticket data for two counties
findings was the difference in frequency of litigation of any type: Virginians litigated 21.45%
of the time, compared to only 9.27% in Wisconsin.
76. Risk aversion refers to the ratio of the second derivative of the utility function to its
first derivative; it has to do with the willingness to settle for less than the expected utility of a
gamble in order to avoid the chance of a bad outcome. See generally Milton Friedman & L.R.
Savage, The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk, 56 J. POL. ECON. 249 (1948). The
literature involving divorce bargaining and assuming risk aversion includes Jane W. Ellis,
Surveying the Terrain: A Review Essay of Divorce Reform at the Crossroads, 44 STAN. L. REV.
471 (1992); Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interests of the Child, 54 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1 (1987); Melli et al., supra note 74, at 1154; Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 72,
at 1025; and Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L.
REV. 615 (1992).
77. Brinig & Alexeev, supra note 71, at 289-90.
78. Id. at 286-87.
79. Id. at 287 & n.38. This.observation was consistent with an explanation that the fathers
visiting their home were more satisfied not only when they had more time with their
children, but when the children were of higher "quality." Fathers also visited more or less
depending upon their opportunity cost of time: if visitation prevented them from earning
substantial sums, they visited less often or for shorter time periods. See Douglas W. Allen,
What Does She See in Him? The Effect of Sharing on the Choice of Spouse, 30 ECON. INQUIRY
57, 65-66 (1992) (attributing divorce to the decrease in value of the marriage to one partner
due to changes in that partner's life, rather than the availability of other possible partners);
Gary S. Becker & Gregg Lewis, On the Interaction Between the Quantity and Quality of
Children, 2 J. POL. ECON. S279, S279 (1985) (the shadow price of children with respect to the
cost of an additional child is greater the higher their quality is).
80. Brinig & Alexeev, supra note 71, at 288. We suggested that this might be because the
wife felt that the father's participation was good for the child, or because she wanted some
time for herself. Id. at 288 & n.44.
81. These involved over 300 subjects drawn from an elementary school, a high school, and
George Mason University metro campus (which houses the law school). Subjects were asked
to choose one of three jars from which to draw a ball. Each jar had a different number of
winning balls, and different size prizes could be won. The choices varied from a "risk averse"
jar, with a 75% chance of winning a small prize to a "risk preferring" jar, with a 10% chance
of winning a large prize. Very young children were uniformly risk averse. As males ap-
proached puberty, increasingly they chose the risk preferring jar. After about age forty, there
was no difference in choices based upon gender.
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in Virginia,82 behavior on state lotteries, life insurance purchases, and the
number of items omitted by men and women taking the SAT.83 In each
case, 84 women did not seem significantly more risk averse than the men in
the population. It was not worth publishing such a nonresult, so I waited to
test another characteristic that might distinguish male and female risk
aversion tendencies. My opportunity came when I read the report of a
study involving altruism reported in Beyond Self-Interest.85 I repeated a
version of the experiment using gender as a variable.86 I also obtained data
on charitable giving broken down by age, income, and gender.87 In neither
82. Arlington County broke down its data between radar and nonradar tickets and
provided the number of violators in each of these two ticket categories, broken down by age.
Fairfax provided individualized data including age, gender, and zip code, from which I could
proxy income for each category. Although women are ticketed for speeding in about the
same proportion as men for less severe offenses, they are much less likely to receive tickets
for speeds greatly in excess of the posted limit, controlling for age and income. The
alternative explanation for these results is that women speed as much as men do, but receive
less severe tickets from arresting officers.
83. In addition to published studies, I ran regressions on a 10,000 person sample drawn
from the November 1991, Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT). The studies had concluded that
"the percentage of females omitting or not reaching any item is consistently greater than the
percentage of males omitting or not reaching that same item. Across all three forms, there
are no items where males omitted at a greater rate than females." Mary Jo Clark & Jerilee
Grandy, Sex Difference in the Academic Performance of Scholastic Aptitude Test Takers,
COLLEGE BOARD REPORT No. 84-8, 7 (1984); see also Alicia Schmitt et al., Differential
Speededness and Item Omit Patterns on the SAT, EDUCATIONAL TESTING SERVICE-REPORT
No. 91-50, 15 (1991) (noting that females on the 1984-85 SAT omitted items more frequently
than males, especially on less difficult questions, although there was no evidence that
females performed less speedily).
84. 1 also examined studies of women's employment performance patterns from the
following sources: Robert Masters & Robert Meier, Sex Differences and Risk-Taking Propen-
sity of Entrepreneurs, J. SMALL Bus. MGMT. 31 (January 1988) (finding no differences
between male and female entrepreneurs' willingness to take risks); Martha Terdick, Women
Like Us, 51 Bus. Q. 60 (Summer 1986); Michael Wallach & Albert Caron, Attribute Criterial-
ity and Sex-Linked Conservativism as Determinants of Psychological Similarity, 58 J. ABNORMAL
SOC. PSYCH. 43 (1959). Further, I examined their purchase of insurance by gender, income,
age, and marital status categories. The data was obtained from LIFE INSURANCE MARKETING
AND RESEARCH ASSOCIATION, INC., THE BUYER STUDY: A MARKET STUDY OF NEW IN-
SUREDS AND THE ORDINARY LIFE INSURANCE PURCHASED (1991).
85. Robyn M. Dawes et al., Cooperation for the Benefit of Us-Not Me, or My Conscience, in
BEYOND SELF INTEREST 97, 101-03 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1991). Other versions of the
study are reported in Robyn Dawes et al., Not Me or Thee But We: The Importance of Group
Identity in Eliciting Cooperation in Dilemma Situations: Experimental Manipulations, 68 ACTA
PSYCHOLOGICA 83 (1988).
86. My experiment, modeled on the one in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST, supra note 85,
included over 600 subjects drawn from various age groups, divided into groups of five. Each
subject could choose to keep five candies or to donate them to the group. If a majority of the
group gave, each member, including those who did not donate, would get an additional five.
The donors would thus get 10, the others 15. If less than a majority contributed, the donors
would lose their five candies while the nondonors would keep theirs. My PROBIT regression
analysis used age, gender, and income as independent variables. There were significant
results for age, but insignificant results for gender.
87. This data is reported in INDEPENDENT SECTOR, GIVING AND VOLUNTEERING IN THE
UNITED STATES 54, 69, tbls. 1.18 & 2.1 (1992).
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my own experiment nor the published data on giving did I find any
perceptible difference in how men and women behaved.88
What conclusions was I able to draw from this empirical work? In the
marketplace, or in any setting not involving their families, women perform
very similarly to men.89 When their husbands and children are involved,
however, -real differences in decision-making appear.9 ° The conclusion of
the bargaining piece-that preferences, not differential risk aversion, deter-
mined the results-still seems correct.9"
88. The tables show that women heads of household give'a total of 1.6% of their income
to charities, while men heads of households give 1.8%. The size of gifts given at every income
level is higher for men than women. See Why Can't a Woman Give Like a Man? WORKING
WOMAN, Nov. 1992, at 70 (studying giving habits of men and women). Single and divorced
women participating in the survey volunteered insignificantly more of their time to charitable
causes than did their male counterparts. Id. In this study, there was no control for income
(opportunity cost).
89. See Joan W. Scott, Deconstructing Equality-Versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of Poststructu-
alist Theory for Feminism, 14 FEMINIST STUD. 33, 46 (1988) (rejecting the use of "difference"
or "equality" to define women while trying to create a structure that allowed women to be
both different and equal; this structure would account for certain behavior in the family and
certain behavior in the workplace such as a willingness to be tough but fair-minded in
business dealings while remaining loving, giving, and nurturing in interactions with children).
90. Despite increasing work force participation, there has been no real change in the
overall time mothers spend with their children. W. Keith Bryant, Are We Investing Less in
the Next Generation? Historical Trends in Time Spent Caring for Children 16-17 (1992)
(presented at Social Science Proceedings, American Statistical Association, Fort Lauder-
dale, Florida, 1993). Work seems to have more impact in those aspects of family life in which
children tend to be "peripheral," such as homemaking or entertaining, compared to activi-
ties that are specifically "child-oriented." Steven L. Nock & Paul William Kingston, Time
with Children: The Impact of Couples' Work-Time Commitments, 67 SOCIAL FORCES 59, 71
(1988). However, despite gender equality and involvement with the work force, it is still
primarily women who raise children. One study showed a disparity of at least 2 to 1 between
women's and men's participation in all aspects of child care. Cynthia Rexroot & Constance
Sheehan, Family Life Cycle and Spouse's Time in Housework, 49 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 737,
744 & tbl. 3 (1987). The division of labor is equally dramatic for household tasks. See FUCHS,
supra note 17, at 103 (comparing the division of household labor in the United States, the
Soviet Union, and Sweden, and finding that in all three countries, women still perform the
overwhelming majority of domestic work); Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender
Paradox and the Limitations of Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 19, 85 & n.14 (1989) (arguing that inclusion of women in the
workforce has not increased the time men spend in the home); Rebecca Stafford et al., The
Division of Labor Among Cohabiting and Married Couples, 39 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 43, 53
(1977) (explaining the persistent division of domestic labor as a function of ideology and
learned behavior rather than the outcome of a power struggle or different amounts of
available time); JoAnn Vanek, Time Spent in Housework, ScI. AM., Nov. 1974, at 116, 118
(noting that employed women spend less time on housework but that husbands of employed
women do not do more housework). It is, of course, possible that what looks like altruism
here is another example of the "draftee" being expected to do necessary work. See Czapan-
skiy, supra note 16 (discussing inequalities in family law that allow men to not care for
children but punish women for the same behavior).
91. Jana Singer, in a recent telephone conversation, suggested that this distinction may
also explain some of the differences between the literature written by women studying
gender differences in the family alone, see, e.g., MARTHA FINEMAN, ILLUSIONS OF EQUALITY
(1991); MARY A. GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 94-102 (1987);
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These discoveries leave a host of unanswered questions. One is whether
these differences are learned92 or innate.93 Another is whether gender
differences will disappear as our children 94 become spouses and parents.
Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child
Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727 (1988); Mary A. Glendon, Family Law
Reform in the 1980s, 44 LA. L. REV. 1553 (1984); and women writing about other women
outside the family who give an entirely different perspective; see, e.g., CATHERINE A.
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 52-53 (1987) (arguing that the mother-child relation-
ship is an outgrowth of male dominance); Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 797, 799-800 (1989) (rejecting Carol Gilligan's description of "women's voice" when
used to marginalize women in the marketplace). Telephone discussion with Jana Singer,
Professor of Law, University of Maryland (Feb. 10, 1994).
92. One proponent of this view is CHODOROW, supra note 16, at 7.
93. Writers who believe the differences are biologically based include: Richard Epstein,
The Varieties of Self-Interest, 8 PHIL. & POL. 102 (1990); Alice S. Rossi, A Biosocial Perspective
on Parenting, 106 DAEDALUS 1 (Spring 1977), Alice S. Rossi, Equality Between the Sexes: An
Immodest Proposal, 93 DAEDALUS 607 (Spring 1964). The theory adopted will determine, to a
great extent, the direction the law takes. The sociobiologists' argument is that gendered
behavior is innate like sexual preference, so that legal changes can only harm people
exercising innate tendencies. Compare Richard A. Posner, The Radical Feminist Critique of
Sex and Reason, 25 CONN. L. REV. 515, 517 (1993) (explaining RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND
REASON (1992) as an exploration of relation between biology and sexuality); and the
criticism of his position in Robin L. West, Sex, Reason and a Taste for the Absurd, 81 GEO.
L.J. 2413, 2419 (1993) (relating and criticizing Posner's theory that individuals have innate
preferences for sexual partners of a certain sex, but will substitute a nonideal partner if the
search costs are too high) with CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY
OF THE STATE 218 (1989) (arguing that all gender differences are socially constructed);
Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 836-37 (1990)
(describing the distinct feminist ways to practice law that spring from women's experiences
in society, not biology); Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the
Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1126-28 (1986) (arguing that
the legal regime has enforced social stereotypes that force women to be seen as different);
Marsha Garrison, Marriage: The Status of Contract, 131 U. PA. L. REY. 1039, 1060 (1983)
(reviewing LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT (1981) and discussing the use
of negotiations for divorce settlements as a change in the law the controls behavior); Herma
Hill Kay, An Appraisal of California's No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 291, 309 (1987)
(defending California's no-fault divorce statute because it led the way for other laws in areas
of child support and family leave, which increased gender equality); Herma Hill Kay,
Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and its Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1, 80 (1987) (proposing a legal regime that includes incentives for women to make
economically abling decisions); Herma Hill Kay, Models of Equality, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 39,
84 (arguing that principles behind Pregnancy Discrimination Act should be applied to
women generally to take account of women's unique circumstances); Sylvia A. Law, Rethink-
ing Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984) (proposing new constitutional
doctrine that would recognize a woman's unique biological functions); Martha Minow, The
Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 34-57
(1987) (tracing the different treatment of certain groups to the inability of the powerful to
question the status quo); Carol Weisbrod, Practical Polyphony: Theories of the State and
Feminist Jurisprudence, 24 GA. L. REV. 985, 1001 (1990) (suggesting that feminist legal theory
would change the legal regime to one that valued pluralism and groups); West, supra note
13, at 28-30 (discussing the differences between cultural feminists who attribute gender
differences to biology and radical feminists who see the differences as socially constructed).
94. They presumably will not have the same problems because they are being raised in an
age where gender equality is treated as a given.
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We might expect this to be the case if the gender discrepancies of today's
world were produced by a society that pressured the current generation of
parents to behave in gendered patterns. I also cannot say whether the
changes in family law that have produced so many other shifts in society
will also change these values. 95 Finally, I do not pretend to divine whether
the current differences in attitudes about family are good or bad. They just
are, and in legal planning I think we will have to reckon with them.
95. No-fault divorce apparently produces fewer marriages, fewer children, and less invest-
ment in marriage. Brinig & Crafton, supra note 23. It has also produced a dramatically
higher divorce rate, and therefore many more children growing up without two parents at
home. See, e.g., Carbone & Brinig, supra note 28, at 975-79 & nn. 96-121.
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